

# Zero Energy Day:

## How Nationwide Blackouts Affect the Economy

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
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
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## Recent events drew attention to nationwide blackouts



- 2025 Chile blackout on February 25, 2025
  - ▶ Lasted up to 24 hours. Over 90% of the population was affected
- 2025 Iberian Peninsula blackout (Spain and Portugal) on April 28
  - ▶ Lasted about 10 hours.
  - ▶ 60% of Spain's demand and 98% of Portugal's demand were affected

# Electricity reliability is a key issue in energy transition



1. Rising global electricity demand with limited or aging infrastructure
  - ▶ US and Europe are facing rising demand with aging infrastructure
  - ▶ Developing world is facing rising demand with limited infrastructure
2. Climate change and extreme weather
  - ▶ Natural disasters strain electrical infrastructure, causing blackouts and increasing maintenance costs (Warner, Callaway, and Fowle, 2025)
3. Renewable energy integration
  - ▶ The variability of solar and wind challenge grid stability

# Limited empirical evidence on the value of lost load (VoLL)


- The value of lost load (VoLL)
  - ▶ Willingness to pay to avoid a disruption in their electricity service
  - ▶ A key parameter for regulators to assess the damages of blackouts
  - ▶ Mostly based on engineering modeling/simulations
- Econ literature's focus has been electricity shortages in manufacturing
  - ▶ Impact of electricity shortages on productivity in manufacturing sectors (Fisher-Vanden, Mansur, Wang, 2015, Allcott, Collard-Wexler, O'Connel)
  - ▶ Evidence on 1) other sectors and 2) nationwide blackouts (as opposed to localized load sheddings) is limited

# We study the impact of Chile's recent nationwide blackouts

- Examine the impact of Chile's nationwide blackout on its retail sector
- Combine electricity data and administrative tax records in Chile
  - ▶ Node-level hourly electricity demand data
  - ▶ Administrative tax records on daily retail sales
- Estimate the blackout-day damage and intertemporal rebound
  - ▶ Heterogeneity by sector by region
- Aim to provide valuable insights for the Value of lost load (VoLL)
  - ▶ Among the first paper to provide empirical evidence on the VoLL
  - ▶ Caveat: Our current focus is retail sectors only

# Background

# What happened on February 25, 2025?



Note: Dashed line represents blackout hour, i.e., 25 February 2025 at 15:00.

- The blackout started at 15:16 on February 25 (Tue) in 2025
- A partial recovery by the night, but it took  $\approx 24$ h to fully recover

# Why did it happen? It started in Coquimbo region

- The blackout was triggered by a malfunction in electronic and software protection systems by an energy distributor ISA Interchile
- As a result, a 500 kV double-circuit high-voltage line in this area failed and disconnected





## Frist official technical diagnostic report

- **Event:** Total blackout of the Chilean National Electric System (SEN).
- **Date and Time:** February 25, 2025, at 15:16 hrs.
- **Disconnection:** 100% of national demand (11,066 MW).
- **Affected installation:** Both circuits of the 2x500 kV Nueva Maitencillo - Nueva Pan de Azcar line, owned by Interchile S.A.
- **Failed element:** Protection System No. 1 of each circuit, specifically the line differential function (87L) in Siemens 7SL87 relays.

Data

## 1) Electricity demand and 2) Administrative tax records

### 1. Hourly electricity demand at the node level (2017-2025)


- ▶ Publicly available
- ▶ There are over 1,000 nodes in Chile.
- ▶ We aggregate it to commune levels

### 2. Administrative tax records on daily retail sales (2018-2025)

- ▶ Confidential data from the Chilean government
- ▶ Daily transaction data at the retail store level
- ▶ Transacted amount and taxes
- ▶ **Advantage:** Tax records provide comprehensive daily retail transactions
- ▶ **Limitation:** Daily data are not available for non-retail sectors

## Results 1: Aggregate impact

# Raw data on aggregate daily sales (in billion Chilean pesos)




- The blackout day was February 25 (Tue) in 2025
- X-axis = days relative to the last Tuesday in February

# Event study analysis

$$Y_{td} = \sum_{j=-14}^{14} \beta_j \cdot D_{j,2025} + \theta_t + \theta_j + \theta_d + \epsilon_{td} \quad (1)$$

- $Y_{td}$  = Aggregate retail sales (in Chilean peso) in year  $t$  on day  $d$
- $j$  = Event-time relative to the blackout day, Feb. 25 (Tue) in 2025
- For 2022-2024,  $j$  = event-time relative to the last Tuesday in February
- $D_{j,2025} = 1$  if  $t = 2025$  and  $d = j$
- $\theta_t$ : Year FE
- $\theta_j$ : Event-time FE (e.g. control for February's last Tues, Wed,...)
- $\theta_d$ : Calendar day FE (e.g. control for February 25, 26,...)

# Event study regression results ( $\hat{\beta}_j$ )



The blackout occurred on February 25, 2025.

Years: 2022-2025.

FEs: year, event day (e.g., -1, 0, 1), calendar day (e.g., Feb 25).

- Controls: year FE, event day FE, and calendar day FE
- **Finding:** Aggregate sales dropped by  $\approx 15$ -20 billion peso (a 40% decline)

## Outage-day effect & Intertemporal recovery effect

Dependent variable: Daily aggregate retail sales (Billions CLP)


	(1)
Blackout-day	-21.19 (2.39)
1-3 days after black-out day	4.81 (1.45)
4-14 days after black-out day	0.60 (0.86)
Observations	116
Year FE	Yes
Event-time FE	Yes
Calendar day FE	Yes

- **Outage-day effect:** Aggregate sales dropped by 21 billion CLP
- **Intertemporal recovery:** Sales increased by 4.8 billion CLP/day in day 1-3



## Results 2: Impact by sector


# Which sectors had larger blackout-day impacts?



- The outcome variable is  $\ln(\text{sector-level total retail sales})$
- The coefficient = the blackout-day impact on sales in log points

# Which sectors had inter-temporal rebound effects?


Sector event 1 to 3 coefficient



- The outcome variable is  $\ln(\text{sector-level total retail sales})$
- The coefficient = the blackout-day impact on sales in log points

## Results 3: Impact by region

# Which regions had larger blackout-day impacts?



- Heterogeneous impacts across region can be due to two reasons:
  - ▶ Power recovery was faster in some regions and later in others
  - ▶ Sectoral compositions are different across regions


## Results 4: Marginal effects of hourly blackouts

# Can we use spatial variation to estimate a marginal effect?



- So far, we focused on the blackout event day impact
- Can we estimate  $\frac{\partial \ln(Y)}{\partial h}$ ? ( $h$  is hours of zero power)
- Node-level demand data allow us to create commune-level “zero power hours”
- Idea 1: Consider this variation as quasi-random (OLS)
- Idea 2: Construct an IV = the distance between each commune and Coquimbo (the origin of the grid failure), instrumenting for zero power hours

# Blackout-day impact (Y) and hours of zero power (X)



- Y = Blackout-day impact on sales (in log points) at the commune level
- X = Hours of zero power in that commune



## Marginal effects of hourly blackouts

Dependent variable: Outage-day impact on sales in log points

	(1) OLS	(2) 1st stage	(3) IV
Hours of zero power	-0.056 (0.015)		
Distance from Coquimbo (1,000km)			
Constant	-0.064 (0.060)		
Observations	140		
$R^2$	0.24		

- **Interpretation:** An additional hour of zero power is associated with a  $\approx -0.056$  (OLS) or  $\approx -0.079$  (IV) percentage point decline in retail sales
- 1st stage: cities farther from Coquimbo had fewer zero power hours

## Marginal effects of hourly blackouts

Dependent variable: Outage-day impact on sales in log points

	(1) OLS	(2) 1st stage	(3) IV
Hours of zero power	-0.056 (0.015)		
Distance from Coquimbo (1,000km)		-3.94 (0.828)	
Constant	-0.064 (0.060)	7.76 (0.650)	
Observations	140	140	
$R^2$	0.24	0.35	

- **Interpretation:** An additional hour of zero power is associated with a  $\approx -0.056$  (OLS) or  $\approx -0.079$  (IV) percentage point decline in retail sales
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## Marginal effects of hourly blackouts

Dependent variable: Outage-day impact on sales in log points

	(1) OLS	(2) 1st stage	(3) IV
Hours of zero power	-0.056 (0.015)		-0.079 (0.019)
Distance from Coquimbo (1,000km)		-3.94 (0.828)	
Constant	-0.064 (0.060)	7.76 (0.650)	0.068 (0.101)
Observations	140	140	140
$R^2$	0.24	0.35	0.20

- **Interpretation:** An additional hour of zero power is associated with a  $\approx -0.056$  (OLS) or  $\approx -0.079$  (IV) percentage point decline in retail sales
- 1st stage: cities farther from Coquimbo had fewer zero power hours

Thank you! Very preliminary and feedback welcome!

# Appendix

# The "zero energy day" in Chile, Feb 25, 2025

## 1 The event

- ▶ At 3:16 p.m., the power was disconnected from the 500 kV "Nueva Maitencillo-Nueva Pan de Azcar" transmission line, located between Vallenar and Coquimbo.
- ▶ Line load at the time of failure: 1.800 MW total.
- ▶ A chain reaction impacted the National Electric System (SEN), causing a blackout from Arica to Los Lagos.

## 2 Impact

- ▶ Retail sales, transportation, telecommunications, mining, mass events, etc.

## 3 Policies reaction

- ▶ Declaration of a state of emergency "Toque de queda".
- ▶ Progressive restoration of electricity supply

# SEN a interconnected electric system



Figure: SING-SIC interconnection.



Figure: SEN system

# Commune Coquimbo: The origin of the collapse



Figure: 500kV circuits that fail and disconnect

- Max Capacity 1.600MW (Sup/def 1.800MW)
- Location: Vallenar - Coquimbo
- Longitud: 212 Km

Figure: SEN electric system map.



## The "zero energy day" in Chile, Feb 25, 2025

- **13:35 hrs:** Interchile reports the failure of the main communications module of function transmission line Maintencillo - Pan azucar, the backup communications system is operational.
- **15:16 hrs:** CDC stops receiving signals from companies in most SEN facilities. The Coordinator's emergency system remains operational, but with outdated and poor quality information.
- **15:17 hrs:** Interchile's CC reports an event at Nueva Pan de Azcar Substation, with an investigation into the cause.
- **15:19 hrs:** CDC instructs Enel Generacion's CC to conduct a survey of the conditions of its facilities and prepare to implement the Service Recovery Plan (SRP).
- **15:36 hrs:** Transelec CC notifies that its SCADA and telephone systems are out of service.
- **16:24 hrs:** 24% of Arica's consumption is recovered
- **17:00 hrs:** 25% of Puerto Montt recovered
- **20:17 hrs:** Barrio Civico is being recovered and consumption recovery will begin.

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# Origin and Cause of the Failure

- **Sequence:** Unexpected breaker openings at both substations without actual faults.
- **Reconnection:** Attempted but insufficient to restore the system.
- **Consequences:** Power oscillations, islanding, and collapse of both islands.
- **Technical cause:** Unexpected operation of 87L due to failed communication module and resynchronization attempt.
- **Investigation:** Ongoing; final report expected Q2 2025.

*At 15:15:41.363, while attempting to restore the communication channel and resynchronize the line differential protection function, an unexpected and unintentional activation of the protection system occurred.*

For more details, refer to the official report:

**Coordinador Electrico de Chile Feb 18, 2025**