## Willingness to Pay for Clean Air: Evidence from Air Purifier Markets in China

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## Air pollution is very severe in developing countries

#### Global Annual Average PM<sub>2.5</sub> Grids from MODIS and MISR Aerosol Optical Depth (AOD), 2010

Satellite-Derived Environmental Indicators



Map Credit: CIESIN Columbia University, April 2013.

Global Annual PM<sub>2.5</sub> Grids from MODIS and MISR Aerosol Optical Depth (AOD) data sets provide annual 'snap shots' of particulate matter 2.5 micrometers or smaller in diameter from 2001–2010. Exposure to fine particles is associated with premature death as well as increased morbidity from respiratory and cardiovascular disease, especially in the elderly, young children, and those already suffering from these linesses. The grids were derived from Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) and Multiangle Imaging SpectroRadiometer (MISR) Aerosol Optical Depth (AOD) data. The raster grids have a grid cell resolution of 30 arc-minutes (0.5 degree or approximately 50 sq. km at the equator) and cover the world from 70°N to 60°S latitude. The grids were produced by researchers as ta Battelle Memorial Institute in collaboration



## Air pollution is very severe in developing countries



Source: Chianews.com

Research question: How much are people willing to pay for clean air in developing countries?

• Severe air pollution  $\Rightarrow$  Health and economic costs

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  - Willingness-to-pay is a key parameter to determine optimal environmental regulation (Greenstone and Jack, 2014)

Research question: How much are people willing to pay for clean air in developing countries?

- Severe air pollution  $\Rightarrow$  Health and economic costs
  - Jayachandran (2009); Greenstone and Hanna (2014); Hanna and Oliva (2015)
- High costs of pollution  $\Rightarrow$  Current env. regulations are not optimal
  - Willingness-to-pay is a key parameter to determine optimal environmental regulation (Greenstone and Jack, 2014)
- Yet, limited evidence on WTP for clean air in developing countries
  - Data: Hard to obtain data required to estimate WTP
  - Identification problems: Hard to have exogenous variation

• Goal: Provide a revealed-preference estimate of WTP for clean air

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- Idea: Estimate demand for home-use air purifiers in Chinese cities
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  - Estimate demand for air purifiers in relation to air pollution
  - This enables us to provide a lower bound of WTP for clean air

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- Data: Scanner data on air purifier sales, prices, and attributes
  Product-by-store level monthly data in 80 cities for 9 years
- Quasi-experimental variation in pollution levels and purifier prices
  - The Huai River Policy  $\Rightarrow$  A natural experiment to air pollution
  - Road distance from factory/port to market ⇒ IV for purifier prices

## Huai river policy created long-run variation in air pollution



- Government built coal-based centralized heating in the North in 1950's
- Created plausibly exogenous, long-run variation in air pollution

## A boiler house in an apartment complex (Shenyang)



Source: Chianews.com

## $PM_{10}$ by distance to the Huai River border (raw data)



• Note: In the US, average  $PM_{10}$  was 55 ug/m<sup>3</sup> in 2014 (it was 85 in 1990)

## Our idea: Analyze demand for air purifiers to learn WTP

- Scanner data on air purifier sales, prices, and attributes
  - Sales and prices at the product-city-store-year-month level
  - 690 products by 45 manufacturers in 80 cities for 2006-2014
  - Detailed attributes (HEPA vs. Non-HEPA, coverage area, etc.)





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## Share of HEPA purifiers sales (raw data)



## Roadmap of the paper

- 1. Develop a framework to estimate WTP for environmental quality from market transaction data on differentiated products
  - Theory work in environmental economics offers an insight (Branden et al. 1991)
  - Connect this insight to demand analysis framework in IO (BLP 1995, Nevo 2001)

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  - Existing evidence is limited due to data and identification problems
  - We use our data and empirical strategy to address these challenges
- 3. Offer important policy implications for environmental policies in China

## Outline of this talk

- Introduction
- Background and Data
- Demand Model
- Empirical Analysis and Results
- Policy Implications
- Conclusion
- Appendix

## 1) Air pollution data

Particulate Matter | Air Research | Research Priorities | Research | US EPA

4/21/15 10:09 PM

- $PM_{10}$ : fine particulate matter  $\leq$  10 micrometers
  - Harmful for health (lung cancer, heart disease, stroke, respiratory infection)



Last updated on May 18, 2012

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- Data: City-level annual average PM<sub>10</sub> from 2006 to 2014
  - Source: Environmental yearbook and environmental quality annual report
  - Complementary data: City-level daily API from Chinese EPA

## 2) Scanner data on air purifier sales and prices

- Available at the product-city-store-year-month level
  - ▶ 690 products by 45 domestic and foreign manufacturers
  - Monthly sales and prices in 2006-2014 in 80 cities
  - Detailed attributes (HEPA vs. Non-HEPA, coverage area, etc.)





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## HEPA vs. Non-HEPA air purifiers

- High Efficiency Particulate Arrestance (HEPA):
  - A necessary attribute for air purifiers to remove PM
  - ▶ It must remove 99.97% of particles  $\geq$  0.3 micrometer (US DOE)
  - Ads in Chinese market: it removes > 99% of PM<sub>2.5</sub> and PM<sub>10</sub>
- Non-HEPA filtration systems do not remove PM
  - It does not remove fine particles such as  $PM_{2.5}$  and  $PM_{10}$
  - However, it still provides other benefits
  - e.g. Remove Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC), gas and odors

## Summary statistics of air purifier data

	All purifiers	HEPA purifiers	Non-HEPA purifiers	Difference in means
Price of a purifier (\$)	454.52	509.64	369.81	139.84***
	(383.81)	(404.24)	(333.45)	[52.14]
Humidifing (0 or 1)	0.164	0.177	0.143	0.034
	(0.370)	(0.382)	(0.351)	[0.070]
Room coverage (square meter)	41.85	44.97	36.50	$8.47^{*}$
	(23.65)	(24.93)	(20.27)	[4.42]
Distance to factory or port (in 100 miles)	7.48	7.32	7.72	-0.39
	(2.87)	(2.69)	(3.12)	[0.45]
Price of a replacement filter (\$)	46.38	56.39	34.92	$21.47^{*}$
	(52.21)	(65.68)	(25.91)	[10.70]
Frequency of filter replacement (in months)	9.03	10.08	7.92	2.17
	(5.93)	(6.55)	(4.97)	[1.37]

Panel A: Air purifier attributes

1. HEPA purifiers are on average more expensive than non-HEPA purifiers

2. Other attributes are in general quite similar between the two types

## 3) Census data

- Demographic and economic variables from the confidential census data
  - We obtained confidential micro data on demographic variables, which include a random sample of households in each city
  - ▶ We also collected economic data (e.g. GDP) at the city-year level

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## Demand Model

- x<sub>c</sub>: Ambient air pollution in city c
- $x_{jc}$ : A reduction in indoor air pollution given the purchase of purifier j

$$x_{jc} = x_c \cdot e_j$$

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- $x_{jc}$ : A reduction in indoor air pollution given the purchase of purifier j

$$x_{jc} = x_c \cdot e_j$$

#### e<sub>j</sub>: Effectiveness in removing PM<sub>10</sub>

• Conditional indirect utility of consumer *i* who purchases purifier *j* 

$$u_{ijc} = \beta_i x_{jc} + \alpha_i p_{jc} + \eta_j + \xi_{jc} + \epsilon_{ijc}$$

β: marginal utility for a pollution reduction. α: disutility for price
 Note: purifiers are durable goods and last for five years on average

1) Standard Logit Demand Approach ( $\beta_i = \beta \& \alpha_i = \alpha$ )

- Assume that  $\epsilon_{ijct} \sim$  extreme value type I distribution
- The market share for air purifier *j* in city *c* is:

$$s_{jc} = \frac{\exp(\beta x_{jc} + \alpha p_{jc} + \eta_j + \xi_{jc})}{\sum_{k=0}^{J} \exp(\beta x_{kc} + \alpha p_{kc} + \eta_k + \xi_{kc})}$$

- The outside option (j = 0) is not to buy any air purifier
- We assume that  $x_{0c} = 0$  (a reduction in indoor air pollution is zero)

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- The outside option (j = 0) is not to buy any air purifier
  We assume that x<sub>0c</sub> = 0 (a reduction in indoor air pollution is zero)
- Log market share for *j* minus log market share for outside option:

$$\ln s_{jc} - \ln s_{0c} = \beta x_{jc} + \alpha p_{jc} + \eta_j + \xi_{jc}$$

• Reductions in indoor pollution  $(x_{jc})$  can be written by:

$$x_{jc} = x_c \cdot HEPA_j = \begin{cases} x_c & \text{if } HEPA_j = 1\\ 0 & \text{if } HEPA_j = 0. \end{cases}$$

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• With city fixed effects ( $\lambda_c$ ), the estimating equation becomes:

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• With city fixed effects ( $\lambda_c$ ), the estimating equation becomes:

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•  $-\frac{\beta}{\alpha}$  = Marginal WTP for a reduction in indoor pollution

- Our estimate is likely to be a lower bound of MWTP
  - ► Households may take other avoidance methods for indoor air pollution (e.g. improve building installation) → We underestimate their MWTP

## 2) Random Coefficient Logit Approach

• Allow heterogeneity in  $\beta$  and  $\alpha$ :

$$u_{ijc} = \beta_i x_{jc} + \alpha_i p_{jc} + \eta_j + \xi_{jc} + \epsilon_{ijc}$$

$$\flat \ \beta_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 y_i + u_i$$

- $a_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 y_i + e_i,$
- Preference heterogeneity is allowed to depend on demographic variables (y<sub>i</sub>) and unobservables u<sub>i</sub> and e<sub>i</sub> (log normal)
- We use confidential household-level census data for y<sub>i</sub>

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- We use confidential household-level census data for y<sub>i</sub>
- Advantage: allows for flexible substitution patterns, less restrictive price elasticity, and heterogeneous tastes (BLP 1995, Nevo 2001)
- Challenge: involves numerical optimization for a highly nonlinear GMM objective function → requires careful estimation (Knittel and Metaxoglou 2013)
#### Note about a potential dynamic decision

- In this paper, we abstract from a consumer's dynamic decision
  - ▶ In our setting, exogenous variation in pollution comes from cross-section
  - ► To exploit this variation, we aggregate our panel data to cross-section
- A new paper in progress: a dynamic discrete choice
  - Test if consumers respond to inter-temporal price variation
  - Investigate how consumers respond to product entries and exits

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$$\ln s_{jc} = \beta x_c \cdot HEPA_j + \alpha p_{jc} + \eta_j + \lambda_c + \epsilon_{jc}$$

1. Pollution is likely to be correlated with unobserved economic factors

We exploit spatial RD of the Huai River heating policy

# Huai river policy created long-run variation in air pollution



- Government built coal-based centralized heating in the North
- Created plausibly exogenous, long-run variation in air pollution

## Institutional details of the Huai River heating policy

- In 1958, the Chinese government built centralized heating systems
  - Only for the cities north of the Huai River borderline
  - Reason: Average January temperature is roughly 0°C along the line
  - This line is not used for any other administrative purposes
- Coal-based facilities produce local air pollution
  - Heat is generated by local boilers within a residential complex
  - This create local air pollution for residents in northern cities

## 1) First stage on PM<sub>10</sub>



• North of the Huai river  $\rightarrow$  Higher PM<sub>10</sub>

# 1) First stage on $PM_{10}$

Dependent variable: $PM_{10}$ in $ug/m^3$				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
North	$24.54^{***}$ (6.97)	$24.55^{***}$ (6.98)	$24.38^{***}$ (8.71)	$24.19^{***} \\ (8.86)$
Observations	49	49	49	49
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.36	0.36	0.56	0.57
Control function for running variable	Linear*North	Quadratic	Linear*North	Quadratic
Demographic controls			Υ	Υ
Longitude quartile FE			Υ	Υ

- Main result: Local linear regression with the bandwidth of 400 miles
- Robust to other choices of bandwidths and functional forms (appendix)
- The amount of  $PM_{10}$  generated by the Huai River Policy = 24.5 ug/m<sup>3</sup>

## Identification assumption behind the RD design

• Assumption: Potential outcomes have to be smooth at the RD cutoff

As always, this is an untestable assumption (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008)

- We provide two sets of evidence that support this assumption
  - 1. Smoothness of observable variables at the RD cutoff (next slide)
  - 2. Include longitude quartile FE to control for west-east unobserved factors

	North	South	Differences in Means	RD Estimates (local linear)
Population (1,000,000)	$2.398 \\ (2.266)$	$2.720 \\ (3.189)$	-0.323 [0.625]	-0.388 [1.411]
Urban population $(1,000,000)$	1.773 (1.770)	1.974 (2.436)	-0.200 [0.480]	-1.092 [1.151]
Years of schooling	$9.30 \\ (0.88)$	8.64 (1.12)	$0.667^{***}$ [0.227]	-0.101 [0.671]
Fraction illiterate	0.052 (0.022)	$0.069 \\ (0.033)$	$-0.016^{**}$ (0.006)	0.003 (0.018)
Fraction completed high school	$\begin{array}{c} 0.338 \ (0.107) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.286 \\ (0.112) \end{array}$	$0.051^{**}$ [0.025]	0.018 [0.074]
Fraction completed college	$\begin{array}{c} 0.052\\ (0.033) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.048 \\ (0.031) \end{array}$	0.004 [0.007]	-0.019 [0.021]
Per capita household income (USD in 2005)	527.52 (152.79)	698.10 (388.20)	-170.58** [67.27]	-134.54 [107.41]
House size (square meter)	75.24 (13.32)	92.04 (17.52)	$-16.80^{***}$ [3.51]	-12.25 [9.34]
Residence built after 1985	$\begin{array}{c} 0.691 \\ (0.083) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.718 \\ (0.075) \end{array}$	-0.027 [0.018]	-0.040 [0.027]
Fraction building materials include reinforced concrete (less insulated)	0.668 (0.187)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.729 \\ (0.147) \end{array}$	-0.061 [0.037]	0.010 [0.107]
Fraction moved within city	$\begin{array}{c} 0.074 \\ (0.030) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.065 \\ (0.022) \end{array}$	0.009 [0.006]	-0.002 [0.010]
Fraction occupation involved with outdoor activities	$\begin{array}{c} 0.218 \\ (0.106) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.208 \\ (0.099) \end{array}$	0.011 [0.023]	0.032 [0.074]

$$\ln s_{jc} = \beta x_c \cdot HEPA_j + \alpha p_{jc} + \eta_j + \lambda_c + \epsilon_{jc}$$

- ▶ We use spatial regression discontinuity of the Huai River heating policy
- 2. Price is likely to be correlated with unobserved demand shocks

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  - ▶ Product FE  $(\eta_j)$  → address product-level unobservables (Nevo 2001)

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  - City FE  $(\lambda_c) \rightarrow$  address city-level unobservables

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  - City FE  $(\lambda_c) \rightarrow$  address city-level unobservables
  - Remaining concern: produce-city specific unobserved demand shocks
  - An ideal instrument is a supply-side cost shifter at the product-city level

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- Product FE  $(\eta_j) \rightarrow$  address product-level unobservables (Nevo 2001)
- City FE  $(\lambda_c) \rightarrow$  address city-level unobservables
- Remaining concern: produce-city specific unobserved demand shocks
- An ideal instrument is a supply-side cost shifter at the product-city level
- Our idea: the transportation cost from factory/port to market

# 2) First stage on price (IV: road distance to factory/port)



- We collected data on each product's factory/port location
- Use GIS to obtain the road distance from factory/port to market

Dependent variable: Price (\$)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Distance to factory in 100 miles	18.43***	18.39***	12.70**	12.67**
	(4.97)	(4.98)	(4.94)	(4.93)
(Distance to factory in 100 miles) <sup>2</sup>	-2.32***	-2.33***	-1.49*	-1.49*
	(0.72)	(0.72)	(0.77)	(0.77)
$(Distance to factory in 100 miles)^3$	0.10***	0.10***	0.06	0.06
(	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Observations	7,359	7,359	7,359	7,359
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96
Control function for running variable	Linear*North	Quadratic	Linear*North	Quadratic
Product FE	Υ	Y	Υ	Y
City FE			Υ	Υ
Longitude quartile FE*HEPA	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Predicted effect of 500 miles on price	46.46***	46.30***	33.22***	33.16***
-	(12.07)	(12.15)	(11.43)	(11.42)
Predicted effect as % of mean price	10.2%	10.2%	7.3%	7.3%

- Longer distance from factory/port to market  $\rightarrow$  Higher prices



• The predicted price-distance relationship

#### An alternative instrument for price as a robustness check

- IO theory predicts that  $p_{jc}$  can be affected by its competitor's cost
  - Consider imperfect competition in differentiated products markets
  - A firm sets a higher  $p_{jc}$  when its competitors have higher marginal costs
  - $\triangleright$   $p_{jc}$  can be affected by the transportation costs of other firms in market c

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  - $\triangleright$   $p_{jc}$  can be affected by the transportation costs of other firms in market c
- IV: Average road distance of the products sold by competing firms
  - Appendix Table A.2: the results remain similar to our main results

• Final specification with control variables:

$$\ln s_{jc} = \beta x_c \cdot HEPA_j + \alpha p_{jc} + \eta_j + \lambda_c + f(d_c) \cdot HEPA_j + \epsilon_{jc}$$

d<sub>c</sub>: distance from the Huai River border (the running variable for the RD)
f(d<sub>c</sub>): local linear or quadratic controls for d<sub>c</sub>

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• 
$$IV_1$$
: North<sub>c</sub> = 1{ $d_c > 0$ }

▶ IV<sub>2</sub>: Linear, quadratic, and cubic of the road distance to factory/port

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- $d_c$ : distance from the Huai River border (the running variable for the RD)
- $f(d_c)$ : local linear or quadratic controls for  $d_c$
- $IV_1$ : *North*<sub>c</sub> = 1{ $d_c > 0$ }
- ▶ IV<sub>2</sub>: Linear, quadratic, and cubic of the road distance to factory/port
- Optimal bandwidth is 400 miles from the river (Imbens and Kalyanaraman 2012)
- We report robustness checks with further narrower bandwidths

• Final specification with control variables:

$$\ln s_{jc} = \beta x_c \cdot HEPA_j + \alpha p_{jc} + \eta_j + \lambda_c + f(d_c) \cdot HEPA_j + \epsilon_{jc}$$

- $d_c$ : distance from the Huai River border (the running variable for the RD)
- $f(d_c)$ : local linear or quadratic controls for  $d_c$
- $IV_1$ : *North*<sub>c</sub> = 1{ $d_c > 0$ }
- ▶ IV<sub>2</sub>: Linear, quadratic, and cubic of the road distance to factory/port
- Optimal bandwidth is 400 miles from the river (Imbens and Kalyanaraman 2012)
- We report robustness checks with further narrower bandwidths
- Standard errors are clustered at the city level

# 3) Second-stage estimation results

Dependent varia	ble: $\ln(\text{market share})$	
	(1)	(2)
PM10*HEPA $(\beta)$	0.0299***	0.0302***
	(0.0030)	(0.0032)
Price $(\alpha)$	-0.0048***	-0.0048***
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Observations	7,359	7,359
First-stage F-Stat	285.16	292.01
Control function for running variable	$Linear^*North$	Quadratic
MWTP for 5 years $(-\beta/\alpha)$	6.2077***	6.3100***
	(0.6649)	(0.7130)
MWTP per year	1.2415***	1.2620***
• •	(0.1330)	(0.1426)

- MWTP = 1.24 per 1 ug/m<sup>3</sup> reduction in PM<sub>10</sub> per year
- Results are robust to the choice of bandwidths (next slide)

Dependent variable: ln(market share)					
	(1) 250 miles	(2) 300 miles	(3) 350 miles	(4) 400 miles	
PM10*HEPA $(\beta)$	0.0296***	0.0322***	0.0268***	0.0299***	
	(0.0029)	(0.0047)	(0.0010)	(0.0030)	
Price $(\alpha)$	-0.0036***	-0.0038***	-0.0042***	-0.0048***	
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	
Observations	5,619	5,878	7,107	7,359	
First-stage F-Stat	1921.77	526.20	1348.93	285.16	
MWTP for 5 years $(-\beta/\alpha)$	8.2840***	8.4562***	6.3748***	6.2077***	
	(1.0665)	(1.4798)	(0.2764)	(0.6649)	
MWTP per year	1.6568***	1.6912***	1.2750***	1.2415***	
	(0.2133)	(0.2960)	(0.0553)	(0.1330)	
Panel B: Control function for the running variable: Quadratic					
	Dependent varia	ble: ln(market sh	are)		
	(1) 250 miles	(2) 300 miles	(3) 350 miles	(4) 400 miles	
PM10*HEPA $(\beta)$	0.0298***	0.0327***	0.0265***	0.0302***	
	(0.0028)	(0.0046)	(0.0010)	(0.0032)	
Price $(\alpha)$	-0.0035***	-0.0037***	-0.0042***	-0.0048***	
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	
Observations	5,619	5,878	7,107	7,359	
First-stage F-Stat	2122.08	467.03	1399.44	292.01	
MWTP for 5 years $(-\beta/\alpha)$	8.4464***	8.7436***	6.3470***	6.3100***	
• ( / / /	(1.0758)	(1.5087)	(0.3034)	(0.7130)	
MWTP per year	1.6893***	1.7487***	1.2694***	1.2620***	

Panel A: Control function for the running variable: Linear\*North

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#### 4) What variation in the data identifies $\beta$ ?

• Recall that the second-stage of the RD design is:

$$\ln s_{jc} = \beta x_c \cdot HEPA_j + \alpha p_{jc} + \eta_j + \lambda_c + f(d_c) \cdot HEPA_j + \epsilon_{jc}$$

- To visualize what variation in the data is identifying  $\beta$ , it is useful to see the reduced-form relationship of the RD design
- Reduced-form relationship of the RD design is:

$$\mathsf{In} s_{jc} = \rho \mathsf{North}_{c} \cdot \mathsf{HEPA}_{j} + \alpha \mathsf{p}_{jc} + \eta_{j} + \lambda_{c} + f(\mathsf{d}_{c}) \cdot \mathsf{HEPA}_{j} + \epsilon_{jc}$$

# Reduced-form of the RD design

$$\mathsf{In} s_{jc} = \rho \mathsf{North}_c \cdot \mathsf{HEPA}_j + \alpha p_{jc} + \eta_j + \lambda_c + f(\mathsf{d}_c) \cdot \mathsf{HEPA}_j + \epsilon_{jc}$$

Dependent varia	ble: ln(market share)	
	(1)	(2)
North*HEPA $(\rho)$	0.4275***	0.4216***
	(0.0329)	(0.0320)
Price $(\alpha)$	-0.0052***	-0.0052***
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Observations	7,359	7,359
First-stage F-Stat	870.29	1115.94
Control function for running variable	Linear*North	Quadratic

#### Reduced-form of the RD design

 $\ln s_{jc} = \rho North_c \cdot HEPA_j + \alpha p_{jc} + \eta_j + \lambda_c + f(d_c) \cdot HEPA_j + \epsilon_{jc}$ 



- $\rho$  captures how ln  $s_{jc}$  for HEPA (relative to non-HEPA) changes at  $North_c = 1$
- Scatterplot:  $E[\ln s_{cj}|HEPA_j = 1] E[\ln s_{cj}|HEPA_j = 0]$

# 5) Random-coefficient logit approach

• Allow heterogeneity in  $\beta$  and  $\alpha$ 

$$u_{ijc} = \beta_i x_{jc} + \alpha_i p_{jc} + \eta_j + \epsilon_{jc} + \epsilon_{ijc}$$

$$\flat \ \beta_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 y_i + u_i$$

- Preference heterogeneity is allowed to depend on demographic variables (y<sub>i</sub>) and unobservables u<sub>i</sub> and e<sub>i</sub>
- We use micro data on household-level income from census for  $y_i$

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- $\triangleright \ \beta_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 y_i + u_i$
- $\triangleright \ \alpha_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 y_i + e_i,$
- Preference heterogeneity is allowed to depend on demographic variables (y<sub>i</sub>) and unobservables u<sub>i</sub> and e<sub>i</sub>
- We use micro data on household-level income from census for  $y_i$
- Nonlinear numerical optimization requires careful investigation
  - 1. Test several nonlinear search algorithms
  - 2. Test 100 sets of random starting values for each search algorithm
  - 3. Use conservative tolerance levels for fixed-point iterations

## Box plot: Objective function values from 100 staring points



Implications

- 1. Testing many staring values is important for nonlinear optimization
- 2. In our case, all search algorithms (except for conjugate gradient) reached the same minimum for more than 90% of the 100 sets of starting values

#### Random-coefficient logit results

	(1)	(2)
PM10 · HEPA		
Mean coefficient $(\beta_0)$	$0.0459^{***}$ (0.0084)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0498^{***} \\ (0.0092) \end{array}$
Interaction household income $(\beta_1)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0924^{***} \\ (0.0224) \end{array}$	$0.0891^{***}$ (0.0253)
Standard deviation $(\sigma_{\beta})$	$0.0056^{***}$ (0.0020)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0102^{***} \\ (0.0021) \end{array}$
Price		
Mean coefficient $(\alpha_0)$	$-0.0069^{***}$ (0.0007)	$-0.0071^{***}$ (0.0007)
Interaction with household income $(\alpha_1)$	$0.0028^{**}$ (0.0011)	$0.0028^{**}$ (0.0011)
Standard deviation $(\sigma_{\alpha})$	$0.0026 \\ (0.0030)$	0.0024 (0.0030)
Observations Control function for running variable GMM objective function value	7,359 Linear*North 375.05	7,359 Quadratic 378.93

• Higher income  $\rightarrow$  Value clean air more ( $\beta_1 > 0$ ) & less price-elastic ( $\alpha_1 > 0$ )

## The relationship between MWTP and household income



• Estimated marginal WTP for clean air is increasing in household income

## Heterogeneity in MWTP for clean air



- Substantial heterogeneity in MWTP
- Mean (\$1.34) is not largely different from the standard logit result (\$1.24)

# 7) Does MWTP for clean air depend on information?

- Limited information may attenuate WTP for environmental quality
  - Especially important in developing countries (Greenstone and Jack, 2013)
  - However, it is generally difficult to test this with non-experimental data
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  - However, it is generally difficult to test this with non-experimental data
- We use widespread media coverage on air pollution after January 2013
  - On January 12th 2013, the US Embassy in Beijing posted air quality index (AQI) of 755, beyond the scale's maximum 500
  - New York Times and other foreign medias started extensive coverage
  - Resulted in widespread media coverage in Chinese newspapers

### Widespread media coverage has started in January, 2013



- Annual number of newspaper headlines from all 631 newspapers in China
- We test if the preference for clean air  $(\beta)$  changed in response to this event

	(1)	(2)	(3)
PM10*HEPA	0.0192***	0.0174***	0.0193***
	(0.0018)	(0.0027)	(0.0025)
PM10*HEPA*Post-2013	0.0329***	0.0307***	0.0280***
	(0.0076)	(0.0079)	(0.0090)
Price	-0.0072***	-0.0072***	-0.0064***
	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Observations	10,780	10,780	10,780
First-stage F-Stat	113.39	112.01	189.15
Control function for running variable	Linear*North	Linear*North	Linear*North
Product FE*Post-2013	Υ	Υ	Υ
City FE*Post-2013	Υ	Υ	Υ
Longitude quartile FE*HEPA*Post-2013	Υ	Υ	Υ
Salary*HEPA		Υ	Υ
Salary*Price			Υ
MWTP per year before 2013	$0.5313^{***}$	0.4867***	0.6001***
	(0.0595)	(0.0874)	(0.0918)
MWTP per year after 2013	$1.4438^{***}$	$1.3458^{***}$	$1.4707^{***}$
	(0.1475)	(0.1376)	(0.2009)
Difference in MWTP per year	$0.9124^{***}$	$0.8591^{***}$	$0.8706^{***}$
	(0.1961)	(0.2040)	(0.2647)

#### We find that MWTP became higher after 2013

### Outline of this talk

- Introduction
- Background and Data
- Demand Model
- Empirical Analysis and Results
- Policy Implications
- Conclusion
- Appendix

### Policy implications

- Policy debate on the tradeoff between growth and environment
  - Chinese Premier Li Keqiang declared "War Against Pollution" in 2014
  - ► A key question is whether such policies enhance social welfare

# Policy implications

- Policy debate on the tradeoff between growth and environment
  - Chinese Premier Li Keqiang declared "War Against Pollution" in 2014
  - A key question is whether such policies enhance social welfare
- Example: A pilot reform for the Huai river policy
  - Recently implemented by the Chinese government and the World Bank
  - Make the heating system more efficient and less polluted in pilot cities

### Make the heating system more efficient and less polluted



Source: Chianews.com

- The cost-effectiveness of this policy is still under debate
- How can we use our WTP estimate for this policy discussion?

- World Bank (2014)
  - ► The cost of the policy was \$2.25M/year for seven pilot cities
  - $\blacktriangleright$  The policy generated a reduction in  $\text{PM}_{10}$  by 11.91  $\text{ug}/\text{m}^3$

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  - ▶ We use our random-coefficient logit estimates to calculate aggregate annual MWTP in these seven cities  $\rightarrow$  \$10.13M per 1 ug/m<sup>3</sup>

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  - This implies that WTP for the 11.91 ug/m<sup>3</sup> reduction is \$120.63M
  - Benefit-cost ratio = 53.6 (= 120.63/2.25)
- Benefit-cost ratio > 0, even with our lower bound MWTP estimate

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- We provide a similar benefit-cost calculation for this question
  - Result: Our WTP estimate by itself is unlikely to justify this proposal

2) Does the WTP justify replacing coal power plants?

- We provide a similar benefit-cost calculation for this question
  - Result: Our WTP estimate by itself is unlikely to justify this proposal
- Reason: Coal is substantially cheaper than other options in China
  - Natural gas in China is not as inexpensive as the one currently in the US
  - Renewables are still substantially more expensive than coal in China

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# Summary

- 1. Develop a framework to estimate WTP for environmental quality from market transaction data on differentiated products
- 2. Provide among the first revealed preference estimates of WTP for clean air in developing countries
  - MWTP (mean) = 1.34 per 1 ug/m<sup>3</sup> reduction in PM<sub>10</sub> per year
  - Substantial heterogeneity in MWTP among households
  - Income and information are key determinants of the heterogeneity
- 3. Offer policy implications for environmental policies in China
  - Heating system reform is likely to be a welfare-enhancing policy
  - Coal power replacement is unlikely to be justified by our WTP estimate